
I've carried removal boxes in and out, and I've been behind people taking in multiple computer boxes, and station wagons so full anything could have been concealed.
Don't Attack Us...At Least Not Until After 4pm...
At the University of Texas at Austin, like at many universities in this country, we have "guard booths" at the major entries to most of the campus (though, curiously, the perimeter areas and major structures like the football stadium are not "protected" within this zone). In light of recent heightened security, the guard booths have suddenly become rather vigilant about stopping any cars without proper university permits and not letting cars go around the side of a car detained at the guard booth. The ironic part is this heightened security only exists from 8am-4pm, even though there are numerous campus courses and events that happen well after 4pm daily. After 4pm the guard booths quickly empty and the campus is accessed by anyone. It is as though the university is suggesting that they might want to protect the interior of the campus prior to 4pm...but after that, we're fair game for whoever might want to drive into campus to do whatever it is we are presumably worried about them doing.
(I'm submitting this, even from my university email account, because I teach about information/communication privacy issues where we talk about such issues, and I'll be curious to read about your top submissions! This is a great idea to collect some of the purely symbolic efforts that we engage in to presumably provide a sense of security. Recognizing these types of actions is important so that people don't develop a false sense of security that can be even more dangerous than a known lack of security.)
Apparently, as they hadn't exploded, they were not dangerous, and he handed them back to me to put back on.
Let this be a warning to future terrorists. Your explosive shoes may go off in the crowded departure lounge instead of on board the plane.
The guards on the ground floor of the Prudential Building, Boston's most prominent skyscraper demand a photo ID of persons entering. The guard writes down the surname of the person entering and lets him or her pass. If a group approaches, the ID of one person is sufficient.
I guess there have been a rash of people calling in to pay other people's bills or something so they have had to tighten payment security. When I asked the first operator to let me speak to her supervisor she flat out refused (I quote "This is not a management issue" ) and she hung up on me. When I did get a "supervisor" on the second call I was told that was the policy and it couldn't be changed.
On about the 5th call to customer service someone finally broke down and gave me my account number so I could pay my bill.
Hi,
I hear you're looking for examples of pointless and intrusive 'security'.
Post 9/11 San Francisco General Hospital, the primary (and for many homeless or poor San Franciscans the only) emergency and critical care facility in San Francisco instituted a new security regime.
Basic behavior included putting armed security guards on the front doors of the hospital, who (for several months) would not let anyone without photo ID enter the building.
San Francisco has a large homeless population (>15,000), most of who either a) do not have photo ID; or b) are wanted for probation or parole violations; or c) are in fear of arrest for some other reason.
End result - hundreds of homeless people in search of urgent medical care turned away either directly by security guards or indirectly when they chose not to 'run the gauntlet' out of fear of possible arrest. Cost of healthcare to the city goes up as people later need ambulance and emergency room care for conditions that could have been dealt with earlier, more humanely and more cheaply. It is also possible, but unproven, that specific individuals died.
Now for the funny bit. While the security goons were harassing those seeking medical care at the main entrance in the name of 'terrorism prevention', all side entrances were left completely unguarded.
Hospital staff, rather than having to constantly fish for ID started using the side entrances in increasing numbers, as did those seeking medical care. So instead of people fronting the triage desk to be most appropriately directed to whatever service they need, the corridors of minor side departments started to fill with people stumbling around lost, looking for *anyone* who might be able to help.
The 'must have photo ID' phase only lasted a couple of months, however the armed guards remain at the front entrance to this day, continuing to deter those in need of medical care from getting it. And side entrances remain open to any who care to wander in.
During the first week, while one would expect interest to be at its peak, I got away scott-free with the following:
I got tired of that and decided to see what would happen if I just shoved the tag into my pocket as I left the office. I roamed the place at will, smiling and nodding at every adult I met.
Finally, I encountered a second-grader, one of my son's classmates whom I knew.
"Ohhhhhh, Mr. Hakala! Where's your name tag?"
Here's one --
If you're like me and always "randomly selected" for a more-rigorous search, wand, strip, bag-empty exercise at the airport, you've probably noticed the huge "S" on your boarding pass.
Seriously, if someone with half a wit is up to something and sees the big "S" on their boarding pass, what are they going to do?
A) Walk away B) Walk back to the ticket counter, re-book on another flight, and make another chance with the "random" selection algorithm.
Either way, it's a pointless measure. The only person it bothers is me, Mr. young, single male on a one-way trip to see my folks.
Bottom line: It's not going to stop -anyone- with half a brain cell and a will to do some harm.
Back in South Africa, a leading retail company sells its own brand of goods. Amongst these are herbs and spices, which come in small glass jars with plastic sprinkler lids. The holes in the sprinkler are sealed with a sticker, labeled a "tamper-proof seal". However, the entire plastic lid simply screws off the top of the jar.
I think one of my favorite "stupid security" measures initiated since 9/11 has been the closure of allBay Area Rapid Transport (BART) restrooms. This closure, I suppose, was meant to limit a terrorist's ability to place a deadly toilet-bomb potentially littering the station with feces.
What behoves me is why any terrorist would choose the BART restrooms to house his infrastructure disabling bomb when in fact a bomb could be easily carried on to the train itself and detonated somewhere within the actual tunnel. There is no security over what can be carried onto the trains as many people take large luggage as well as bikes. Police often stand by as a "show of force" against the potential carry-on bomb but do nothing to search anyone, even on a random spot check level.
Since these restroom have been closed I have however noticed another form of rabid "bio terrorism" being waged on the trains, public urination. Now, closing the restrooms may be a simple solution for some, but for those who find themselves having to urinate while within the BART system (some train journeys can take over 1 hour) now must do so on the steps, platform, or my personal favorite, the train cars themselves.
How has BART responded to this act? Well, they have procured a special URINE cone which on a daily basis warns riders at the Oakland 12th Street of the dangers of Urine.
The risks of a terrorist act on a public transportation system are great closing public restroom is simply a ploy to use this fear to reduce costs for an underfunded agency. UMMMMMM the sweet smell of urine is sure to boost ridership.